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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For all the suggestiveness and staying power of his market-in-ideas 
metaphor, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s most significant influence on 
First Amendment law has turned out to be his notion that only imminent 
harm can justify punishment for expressions of opinion.  This emphasis 
on the time dimension in the calculus of harm is now entrenched in 
modern doctrine.1  It is easy to imagine how First Amendment law might 
have developed differently had Holmes’s peculiar focus on imminence 
not been a factor in shaping how the freedom of speech has come to be 
understood in the United States.2  
Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States3 in November of 1919 
resolved some important ambiguities regarding his understanding of 
the role of time in identifying the harm-causing potential that can justify 
regulating political advocacy.  He had introduced his clear-and-present-
danger test eight months earlier in Schenck v. United States,4 applying it 
to uphold criminal convictions of two speakers for distributing 
pamphlets harshly criticizing the current war and the conscription of 
soldiers to fight it.  The same day, Holmes curiously failed to mention 
the test while upholding another conviction for war criticism, this time 
contained in a German-language newspaper.5  A week later, he wrote the 
majority opinion upholding the conviction of Eugene Debs, the most 
 
 1 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  See also Thomas Healy, 
Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655 (2009). 
 2 Justice Felix Frankfurter, Justice Robert Jackson, and Judge Learned Hand all 
embraced interpretations of the freedom of speech that do not limit the power to punish 
advocacy to situations in which the predicted harm is imminent.  See Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Id. at 561 (Jackson, J., 
concurring); Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (Hand, D.J.).  See also 
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, C.J.).  On how advocacy can 
be punished on the basis of non-imminent harms under the Canadian Constitution, see 
RONALD KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 51–52 
(New York Univ. Press 2006).  On how non-imminent harms figure in decisions of the 
International Court of Justice and the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreting 
pertinent international conventions, see Amal Clooney & Philippa Webb, The Right to 
Insult in International Law, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 35–37 (2017).   
 3 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919).  
 4 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 5 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
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famous Socialist in the land, for giving a public speech praising draft 
resisters.6  That opinion also failed to say anything about clear and 
present danger.  Combined, the three decisions left confusion in their 
wake regarding what test applied in political advocacy cases. 
Moreover, parsing the one opinion in which Holmes did apply the 
clear-and-present-danger test, Schenck, leaves the reader with several 
questions regarding the meaning of its terms.  For example, under the 
test as he formulated it, what needs to be “present” as well as “clear” is 
the danger rather than the realization of harm.  Moreover, “present” can 
mean “being in view or at hand” (thus, doubling down on “clear”) as well 
as “now existing or in progress.”7  So exactly what role did Holmes 
ascribe to the passage of time in demarcating the dangers that can justify 
the regulation of “expressions of opinion and exhortations?”8 
In Schenck, Holmes defended his assumption that harm can justify 
regulating speech by offering examples of utterances he took to be self-
evidently within the government’s authority to punish.  His most famous 
example, of course, was “falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a 
panic.”9  That illustration certainly is about the instant effect that an 
utterance can have.  But Holmes included two other examples in 
Schenck: “uttering words that may have all the effect of force”10 and “if 
an actual obstruction of the recruiting service were proved.”11  Words 
“that may have all the effect of force” might, but need not, result in 
instantaneous consequences, as when a person in authority gives an 
order for subordinates to act at a specified time in the future.  And an 
“actual obstruction” by means of speech convincing someone to refuse 
to be conscripted could occur either immediately or eventually.  
Holmes’s example seemed to encompass both scenarios.  Moreover, in 
Frohwerk v. United States, one of the cases in which Holmes upheld a 
conviction while never mentioning clear and present danger, he cited 
“the counselling of a murder”12 as an example of speech that can be 
punished consistently with the First Amendment.  Counseling a murder 
might occasionally be a call for immediate action, but more often it will 
be advice to do the evil deed after some planning and waiting on 
opportunity.  Holmes’s use of these examples to show that much speech 
 
 6 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).  
 7 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 921 (Frederick C. Mish et al. eds., 
10th ed. 1994).  
 8 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 631. 
 9 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919). 
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can be regulated hardly implies that speech can be regulated only when 
it threatens to cause harm in a very short time period.  
But in his Abrams dissent, Holmes left little doubt about the role of 
time in his danger test: “[T]he United States constitutionally may punish 
speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent 
danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that 
the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent.”13  Here, he 
clears up the ambiguity regarding “present” by substituting “imminent” 
and “forthwith,” surely references to time.  Later in the opinion he says 
that what is needed to justify regulation is “the present danger of 
immediate evil.”14  
Why did Holmes choose, at least as of his Abrams dissent, to 
disallow all justifications for regulating speech that rest upon harms 
resulting from delayed or cumulative effects?  Some such harms can be 
consequential.  Audience members moved by a speaker’s call to mischief 
might take a while to summon up the will or means to act, but once they 
do, great damage can result.  There are facilitative and enabling harms 
that play out over time, for example, harms that take the form of 
recruiting and training persons for future harmful actions.  There can be 
slow-developing but ultimately destructive harms to the discursive and 
inquisitive atmosphere.  By insidious means, speech can cause harm to 
political goods such as trust, accountability, tolerance, mutual respect, 
recognition of legitimate authority, acceptance of defeat, fulfillment of 
duties, and willingness to sacrifice.  Speech can undermine the civic 
standing of individuals and groups.  Surely Holmes did not believe that 
only imminent harms can do much damage.  So how might he have 
defended his emphasis on the time factor of the harm calculus had he 
taken the trouble to develop his reasons in more detail?  
II.  EIGHT ARGUMENTS FOR REQUIRING IMMINENCE 
I can think of eight arguments for treating imminent harms 
differently from more remote harms so far as justifying the regulation 
of speech is concerned.  Some arguments, it should be said at the outset, 
fit better than others with Holmes’s broader patterns of thought. 
A.  Argument One: Remote harms from dangerous advocacy can be 
prevented or contained by refutation. 
Holmes’s assertion in his Abrams dissent that “the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
 
 13 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627. 
 14 Id. at 628. 
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the market”15 could be read to imply the strategic judgment that, absent 
immediacy of impact, the harm that speech can cause is best contained 
by refutation.  Were that his claim, he would be in good company.  In 
Areopagitica, the foundational essay of the free speech literature, John 
Milton says of falsehood, “Her confuting is the best and surest 
suppressing.”16  In his renowned concurring opinion in Whitney v. 
California, Justice Brandeis proclaims, “the fitting remedy for evil 
counsels is good ones.”17  Holmes joined that opinion, in which Brandeis 
eloquently underscored his call to “regulate” dangerous advocacy 
through informed criticism rather than punishment: “If there be time to 
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil 
by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, 
not enforced silence.”18  
Were we to interpret Holmes’s joining of Brandeis’ Whitney 
concurrence as signaling his full agreement with the details of the 
argument, it would be hard to escape the conclusion that he had 
considerable faith in the power of refutation.  And Holmes does say in 
the stirring final paragraph of the Abrams dissent that ordinarily we 
should “leave the correction of evil counsels to time,”19 perhaps 
implying that what time permits is the opportunity to demonstrate the 
“falsehood and fallacies” of the speech at issue. 
I think that is reading too much into Holmes’s signing on to the 
Whitney concurrence and invoking “time” as the preferred remedy in 
Abrams.  In his day, joining a colleague’s opinion proved much less about 
agreement on specifics than it does in the current age of promiscuous 
separate opinions.  Most telling, in many of his other writings, Holmes 
commented on the notable persistence of bad ideas in the face of 
demonstrably telling refutation.  Consider this lament he wrote to 
Frederick Pollock: “Malthus pleased me immensely—and left me sad.  A 
hundred years ago he busted fallacies that politicians and labor leaders 
still live on.  One thinks that an error exposed is dead, but exposure 
amounts to nothing when people want to believe.”20  
 
 15 Id. at 630. 
 16 John Milton, Areopagitica, in COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 716, 746 (Merritt Y. 
Hughes ed., 1957).  
 17 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 18 Id. at 377. 
 19 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630–31. 
 20 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1914), in 1 
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 219 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942).  For a more colorful 
reiteration of this observation, see Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski 
(Dec. 26, 1917), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 122 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) (“When 
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Holmes was deeply interested in the workings of time as a force in 
human affairs, including as a force shaping the development of societal 
institutions and understanding.  A year before writing the Abrams 
dissent, he observed in a law review article that “property, friendship, 
and truth have a common root in time.”21  In the famous concluding 
paragraph of the dissent, where Holmes introduces his market “test of 
truth,” the empirical grounding for his argument is that “time has upset 
many fighting faiths.”22  But so far as I can find, he never listed among 
the benefits of “time” that it facilitates the making of counter-arguments.  
Regarding Holmes’s intellectual kinship with Brandeis, who lived 
for detailed, fact-based argumentation, the genuine bond between the 
two legal titans had something of the quality of opposites attracting.  
Two months after Holmes wrote his opinions in Schenck and Debs, he 
reported to Pollock that: 
Brandeis the other day drove a harpoon into my midriff with 
reference to my summer occupations.  He said you talk about 
improving your mind, you only exercise it on the subjects with 
which you are familiar.  Why don’t you try something new . . . .  
Take up the textile industries in Massachusetts and after 
reading the reports sufficiently you can go to Lawrence and 
get a human notion of how it really is.23 
Conceding to Pollock that Brandeis had a pedagogic point, Holmes 
admitted that he could never complete the assignment: “I hate facts. . . . 
I have little doubt that it would be good for my immortal soul to plunge 
into them, good also for the performance of my duties, but I shrink from 
the bore . . . .”24   
This is not to suggest that Holmes and Brandeis had nothing in 
common that bears on how they thought about the freedom of speech.  
On some fundamental matters, they held similar views.  Both believed 
that freedom of speech is primarily for the benefit of audiences and the 
society beyond (and in the future) rather than the speakers themselves, 
although Holmes was more single-minded than Brandeis in thinking so.  
Both cared about the state of public opinion and thought that the 
freedom of speech can serve the project of producing and maintaining a 
 
I read Malthus, I thought he had ripped the guts out of some humbugs—but they are as 
alive as ever today. Humbugs have no guts—and live all the better without them.”). 
 21 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1918). 
 22 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. 
 23 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (May 26, 1919), in 2 
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 13–14 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942). 
 24 Id. 
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public opinion that enables the “wishes” of the populace to be “safely . . . 
carried out.”25   
Holmes’s concern for audience and societal well-being meant that 
he had to consider the harm that speech can cause over time.  He did not 
share Brandeis’ faith that possible future harm from speech can be 
neutralized or contained by refutation, but he did think that his cure-all 
“time” provides other weapons for limiting harms that do not 
materialize immediately.  
B.  Argument Two: Remote harms from dangerous advocacy will be 
limited by the predictable dissipation over time of energy and 
will.  
Holmes received considerable criticism about his Debs opinion 
from prominent liberals who previously had lionized him for his 
dissents in Lochner v. New York26 and Hammer v. Dagenhart.27  That 
criticism prompted him to write to Herbert Croly, editor of the New 
Republic, defending himself.  Holmes said in the letter: 
I hated to have to write the Debs case and still more those of 
the other poor devils before us the same day and the week 
before.  I could not see the wisdom of pressing the cases . . . but 
I cannot doubt that there was evidence warranting a 
conviction on the disputed issues of fact. . . . When people are 
putting out all their energies in battle I don’t think it 
unreasonable to say we won’t have obstacles intentionally put 
in the way of raising troops—by persuasion any more than by 
force.  But in the main I am for aeration of all effervescing 
convictions—there is no way so quick for letting them get 
flat.28 
The justification Holmes gives in the letter for “aeration of all 
effervescing convictions” may be glib, but the argument that ideas can 
“get flat” if given time should be taken seriously.  The notion that ideas 
tend to lose their potency over time might justify disallowing 
consideration of remote harms when determining whether political 
advocacy can be punished.   
 
 25 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. 
 26 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that states have the power to prescribe maximum hours for bakers). 
 27 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277–81 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that Congress has the power to prohibit child labor in industries which market 
their goods in interstate commerce). 
 28 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 20, at 203 (letter of May 13, 1919).  He never 
sent the letter to Croly because he told his trusted correspondent Harold Laski, “some 
themes may become burning.”  But Holmes couldn’t resist sharing the letter with Laski. 
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Holmes conceived the “competition of the market” in ideas to be 
largely about contending forces holding irreconcilable, incorrigible 
beliefs—”Can’t Helps,” he called them29—trying to muster the energy, 
strength of will, savvy, persistence, and numbers to prevail.  In this view, 
persuasion, enlightenment, empirical proof, and the spirit of inquiry 
play minor supporting roles at best.30  In 1900, writing an introduction 
to a new edition of Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws, Holmes opined 
that “the proximate test of a good government is that the dominant 
power has its way.”31  In a speech to the Harvard Law School Association 
of New York in 1913, he asserted that “the function of private ownership 
is to divine in advance the equilibrium of social desires . . . .”32  In an 
article published in the Harvard Law Review in 1918, the year before he 
confronted the First Amendment claims in Schenck, Debs, and Abrams, 
Holmes wrote:  
I used to say, when I was young, that truth was the majority 
vote of that nation that could lick all others . . . . and I think that 
the statement was correct in so far as it implied that our test 
of truth is a reference to either a present or an imagined future 
majority in favor of our view.33   
Seven years later, at age eighty-four, the conflating of truth and power 
remained his theme.  In his dissent in Gitlow v. New York, Holmes said, 
“If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are 
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the 
only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance 
and have their way.”34 
Someone who believes that the significance of public speech lies 
more in how it engenders motivation and mobilization than in how it 
facilitates persuasion or enlightenment might well think that the best 
force against dangerous messages is time.  Would-be inciters of 
potentially harmful actions and commitments often have difficulty 
sustaining enthusiasm after the initial iconoclastic excitement wears off.  
Political energy, whether reformist, revolutionary, or revanchist, is a 
finite resource and one that usually wanes over time.  When in his 
 
 29 Holmes, supra note 21, at 40. 
 30 See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1,  
38–44. 
 31 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, MONTESQUIEU (1900), reprinted in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
250, 258 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. ed., 1921). 
 32 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the 
Harvard Law School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), reprinted in COLLECTED 
LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 31, at 294. 
 33 Holmes, supra note 21, at 40. 
 34 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Abrams dissent Holmes enjoins us to “leave the correction of evil 
counsels to time” whenever the dangers they pose are not imminent, he 
may have been banking on energy diminution.   
If so, he was painting with too broad a brush.  A full consideration 
of the matter requires attention to the role that leadership and 
organization can play in sustaining the energy to use speech to do harm.  
Isolated demagogues may be defanged by time, but time can be a friend 
to patient, systematic organizers of harm creation.  To address that 
problem, Holmes would need another argument.  
C.  Argument Three: Remote harms can still be addressed under 
Holmes’s imminence requirement because his test applies only 
to one type of regulation of one type of speech: criminal or 
severe civil punishment for expressions of opinion that do not 
encroach upon private rights.  
A common mistake in analyzing a legal standard, whether adopted 
or proposed, is to focus too much on the standard’s prescriptions and 
not enough on its range of coverage.  In trying to understand Holmes’s 
reasons for disallowing the consideration of remote harms in cases like 
Abrams, we need to have a sense of what kinds of disputes about speech 
he thought should be governed by his clear-and-present-danger test.  In 
fact, Holmes said some things in his Abrams dissent which suggest that 
he did not envision his test having extensive coverage.  
The closing sentence of the dissenting opinion begins: “Of course, I 
am speaking only of expressions of opinion and exhortations, which were 
all that were uttered here . . . .”35  Earlier in the opinion, he states his 
proposed standard: “It is only the present danger of immediate evil or 
an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the 
expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned.”36  And 
again in the famous final paragraph: 
[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the 
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught 
with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate 
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law 
that an immediate check is required to save the country.37  
Apparently he did not think his demanding clear-and-present-danger 
test should apply to regulations of speech that do not target expressions 
of opinion.  Moreover, if we take him literally, even the regulation of 
 
 35 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 631 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).   
 36 Id. at 628 (emphasis added). 
 37 Id. at 630 (emphasis added).  
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opinion might fall outside the ken of his test when it is designed to 
protect private rights. 
If it is helpful for interpreting Holmes—and it may not be—to look 
to opinions he wrote while serving on the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, his differentiating and categorizing various kinds of 
speech disputes in Abrams should come as no surprise.  In defamation 
actions, he ruled that the privilege that protects factual errors made in 
good faith in a private letter of recommendation does not apply to errors 
made by a newspaper accusing a private party of fraudulent dealings 
with public officials.38  He refused to enjoin labor picketing that harms a 
business by persuading customers, suppliers, or scabs not to deal with 
it, but permitted injunctions against picketing that urges breach of an 
existing contract, threatens violence, or blocks physical passage.39  
Because he placed speech disputes involving access to government 
property or employment in a separate category, he had no trouble 
concluding that a municipality can prohibit its police officers from 
soliciting political contributions40 and disallow public speaking on its 
commons. 41 
Holmes’s lifelong practice of refusing to treat all cases involving 
speech as raising similar issues also explains the examples he adduced 
in Schenck and Frohwerk of speech he considered punishable even when 
the harm it causes is delayed.  None of his examples of such speech 
involve “the expression of opinions where private rights are not 
concerned.”42  Like personal defamation, counseling murder threatens 
the private right of the specifically targeted victim.  Giving an order to a 
subordinate or devoted follower that “has all the effect of force”43 is 
more than an exhortation or expression of an opinion.  In Frohwerk, 
Holmes observed that the First Amendment “cannot have been, and 
obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every possible use of 
language.”44  Clearly he conceived of his clear-and-present-danger test 
as applicable to only a subset of speech disputes.  
 
 
 38 See Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 28 N.E. 1, 6 (Mass. 1891). 
 39 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896). 
 40 McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892). 
 41 Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895). 
 42 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628. 
 43 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
 44 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).  I am indebted to Frederick 
Schauer for calling my attention to this important dictum.  See Frederick Schauer, Every 
Possible Use of Language?, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY 33–47 (L. Bollinger & G. Stone eds., 
2019). 
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Dicta and examples such as these might tempt us to think that 
Holmes understood criminal prosecutions for speech of the sort at issue 
in Schenck and Abrams to be the exclusive province of the clear-and-
present-danger test, leaving the consideration of remote harms to be 
permissible in other kinds of prosecutions, civil actions for damages, 
and disputes over access to government resources, including public 
employment.  It should be noted, however, that in a case that did not 
involve criminal prosecution, decided the year before his embrace of the 
imminence requirement in Abrams, Holmes took his brethren to task for 
ruling that the federal contempt-of-court statute applies not just to 
outbursts in the presence of the judge but also published accusations of 
judicial incompetence or lack of integrity.45  His dissent, although an 
exercise in statutory interpretation, reads like a dress rehearsal for 
Abrams in its emphasis on the importance of the immediacy factor.46  
Moreover, it was a case involving naturalization rather than 
criminal prosecution that provoked Holmes to what may be his most 
eloquent protest against letting remote harms justify the regulation of 
speech.  In United States v. Schwimmer, decided in 1929, the Court ruled 
that naturalized citizenship can be denied on the basis of the applicant’s 
pacifist beliefs.47  The concern that justified the denial of citizenship, 
said Justice Butler for the majority, was the possibility that in some 
future war Ms. Schwimmer might express her pacifism publicly, to the 
detriment of military mobilization.48  This preposterous remote harm 
rationale provoked the eighty-eight-year-old Holmes to take up his 
potent pen one last time in defense of the freedom of speech.  He noted 
the pacifist beliefs of the Quakers and suggested that few Americans 
wished for their expulsion from the country “because they believe more 
than some of us do in the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount.”49  
The appreciation that Holmes was sensitive to the coverage 
question and did not treat all regulations or categories of speech as 
warranting identical legal treatment goes some distance to answer the 
criticism that, for many purposes, any sensible legal regime has to be 
 
 45 See Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 422–23 (1918) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting). 
 46 See also United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 
255 U.S. 407, 436–37 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting), in which Holmes read the First 
Amendment to protect speakers from being denied second-class postal privileges on the 
basis of their prior alleged violations of the Espionage Act.  In that case, Holmes did not 
invoke the clear-and-present-danger test, but he did hold a non-criminal regulation of 
speech to a high bar of justification.  See id. 
 47 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).  
 48 Id. at 651–53. 
 49 Id. at 655 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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able to consider remote harms caused by speech.  But we really cannot 
judge whether Holmes’s imminence requirement can be defended based 
on its limited coverage without greater elaboration than he provided 
regarding the scope of application he envisioned for his demanding 
danger test.  
D.  Argument Four: Remote harms cannot count because only 
imminent harms can be predicted and measured with any 
degree of rigor, objectivity, and accuracy.  
The passage of time introduces so many variables that any 
estimation of the causal relationship between an expression of opinion 
and remote harm must consist of guesswork untethered by evidence.  
Consider what proof would be required to establish that the public 
airing of a despicable opinion caused a subsequent (that is, “remote”) 
harmful consequence such as a terrorist bombing, a sexual assault, or a 
measurable increase in racially-motivated violence.  We might predict 
that such speech would lead eventually to such consequences, but that 
judgment would be based on broad assumptions about general patterns 
of influence rather than anything specific to the particular speech events 
and the particular harms.  Inevitably, the prediction of remote harm is a 
speculative enterprise, rarely systematic or evidence based.  
The speculation is compounded in the case of remote harms that 
have a cumulative character.  How is a court to decide which discrete 
harms build on each other such that they are best considered together 
as an entity?  Must the process of accumulation have a synergistic 
dimension, or can numerous independent events sometimes make up a 
whole?  How is a court to know when a critical mass of harm has been 
achieved?  And even if answers to these questions can be stipulated for 
the purpose of doctrinal formulation and case resolution, how is the 
phenomenon of accumulation to be proved in individual cases? 
Holmes might have required imminence as a way of making 
consequentialist analysis in the First Amendment realm satisfy 
standards of objectivity worthy of legal and scientific positivism.  As 
Robert Gordon explains:  
Positivism . . . is the belief that explanation must be scientific, 
and that to be scientific it must confine its investigation to 
observable phenomena—facts—and its method to induction 
. . . .  One can read whole sections of The Common Law as 
Holmes’ attempt to turn law into something that permits the 
exercise of this sort of positivist method.50   
 
 50 Robert W. Gordon, Holmes’ Common Law as Legal and Social Science, 10 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 719, 723 (1982).  On Holmes’s attachment to inductive reasoning, see H. L. 
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In his writing about the common law, Holmes went out of his way to 
embrace standards of legal liability that are “external,” by which he 
meant turning on observable phenomena subject to evidentiary proof.51  
For example, in contract law he would have nothing to do with 
subjective meeting of the minds; he thought that promissory obligations 
derive from external manifestation.52  
Still, whether Holmes should be considered a “positivist” is a 
complicated question.  Knowledgeable students of the Justice differ 
regarding whether he was a legal positivist in the sense of someone like 
H.L.A. Hart or Joseph Raz who derives legal authority exclusively from 
objective phenomena.53  Of course, one does not need to be a legal 
positivist to be a scientific positivist in the sense of someone who 
withholds judgment about physical phenomena, including causal 
relationships, in the absence of specific objective evidence.  It is 
scientific positivism (more precisely, social science or sociological 
positivism) that raises questions about whether remote harms from 
expressions of opinion can be accurately forecast. 
There can be no doubt about Holmes’s attraction to the scientific 
method.  When asked whether reading Voltaire had influenced his 
understanding of the nature of truth, he responded, “Oh no—it was not 
Voltaire—it was the influence of the scientific way of looking at the 
world . . . .”54  Holmes’s father, in addition to being a celebrated poet, was 
a medical scientist who made a major discovery tracing a certain type of 
bacterial infection during childbirth to inadequate sterilization.55 
 
POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE 127–32 (Harvard 
Univ. Press 1984). 
 51 See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, 2 JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS  
85–87, 164, 240 (Harvard Univ. Press 1963). 
 52 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464–65 
(1897). 
 53 The literature on this subject is rich.  See Gordon, supra note 50, at 722–27; Henry 
M. Hart, Jr., Comment, Holmes’ Positivism—An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 929 (1951); 
Mark Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the Supreme Judicial 
Court, 63 VA. L. REV. 975, 1044–45 (1977); Catherine Pierce Wells, Holmes on Legal 
Method: The Predictive Theory of Law as an Instance of Scientific Method, 18 SO. ILL. U. L. 
J. 329 (1994); Robin West, Three Positivisms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 791 (1998).  For a powerful 
refutation of the legal positivist hypothesis, see Thomas C. Grey, Molecular Motions: The 
Holmesian Judge in Theory and Practice, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 19 (1995).  For brief 
accounts of the legal positivism of Hart and Raz, see RAYMOND WACKS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: 
A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 26–32, 37–39 (2006). 
 54 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Morris R. Cohen (Feb. 5, 1919), in Felix 
Cohen, The Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, 9 J. HIST. IDEAS 3, 14 (1948).  
 55 G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 10 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1995). 
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The senior Holmes said that two things he had learned from 
studying in Paris with a world-renowned pathologist were “not to take 
authority when I have no facts” and “not to guess when I can know.”56  
Justice Holmes once described himself as an even more consistent 
adherent to the precepts of scientific positivism than was his father:   
[T]here was with him, as with the rest of his generation, a 
certain softness of attitude toward the interstitial miracle—
the phenomenon without phenomenal antecedents, that I did 
not feel. . . .  Probably a skeptical temperament that I got from 
my mother had something to do with my way of thinking. . . .  
But I think science was at the bottom.57 
On that occasion, Holmes was writing to a philosopher of science, Morris 
Cohen, so he could have been aiming to please.  Nevertheless, it would 
have been perfectly natural for him to have extended his characteristic 
skepticism to the question of how rigorous it is possible to be in 
predicting the remote harms that expressions of political opinion will 
cause. 
E.  Argument Five: Allowing remote harms to be a basis for 
regulating speech deprives putative speakers of knowable 
standards for determining their possible legal jeopardy.   
In common law actions for negligence, Holmes believed that, over 
time, judges ought to be able to develop specific rules defining which 
precautions need to be taken in recurring situations.  He had no quarrel 
with having jurors decide based on their experience what precautions a 
person of ordinary prudence would take in particular circumstances, 
but he believed that eventually the pattern of jury judgments in 
recurring situations ought to be crystallized by judges into directive 
rules to give actors more notice of their legal duties.58  This call for 
directive judge-made common law rules never did take hold, perhaps 
because most judges do not prioritize doctrinal transparency and 
stability as much as Holmes did.  
In a federal district court case decided two years before Holmes 
embraced the imminence requirement in his Abrams dissent, Judge 
Learned Hand adopted a test that might be considered the gold standard 
for notifying potential speakers of what they can and cannot say if they 
 
 56 See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, 1 JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS 17 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1957). 
 57 Cohen, supra note 54, at 14–15.   
 58 See WHITE, supra note 55, at 162–63; see also Thomas C. Grey, Plotting the Path of 
the Law, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 19, 40–41 (1997) (“Holmes placed a very high value on making 
and keeping law predictable.”). 
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want to avoid criminal liability.  Hand interpreted the federal Espionage 
Act of 1917,59 the statute that Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs were later 
convicted of violating, to permit all criticism of government policy and 
actions, even “hostile criticism,” so long as the speaker does not “counsel 
or advise others to violate the law as it stands.”60  Hand elaborated, “To 
counsel or advise a man to an act is to urge upon him either that it is his 
interest or his duty to do it.”61  The Second Circuit reversed Hand and 
rejected his test,62 but he had occasion to urge his test on Holmes in 
private correspondence, albeit unsuccessfully, shortly after the Schenck, 
Debs, and Abrams cases were decided.63 
Ever since Hand and Holmes failed to resolve their differences, 
Holmes focusing on danger and Hand focusing on message, students of 
the First Amendment have set up their respective tests as competing 
approaches to the task of developing a relatively speaker-protective 
First Amendment standard.64  The contrast can be illuminating, but 
easily overlooked is how Hand might have influenced Holmes regarding 
the importance of having a test that gives speakers notice of what they 
can say with legal impunity.65  On that score, Hand’s test certainly is 
better, but the way Holmes in Abrams unambiguously disallowed the 
consideration of remote harms eliminated the greatest source of 
uncertainty inherent in a test that turns on predicted danger.  Both the 
Hand and Holmes tests give speakers much better notice than would any 
test that considered the remote harms caused by expressions of opinion. 
One of the most trenchant criticisms of Holmes’s majority opinion 
in the Debs case came from the distinguished University of Chicago law 
professor Ernst Freund.  In an article published in the New Republic in 
May of 1919,66 Freund took issue with Holmes on several points, 
 
 59 Espionage Act, ch. 30, § 1, 40 Stat. 217–31 (repealed 1948). 
 60 See Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (Hand, D.J.).   
 61 Id.  Very likely thinking of Mark Anthony’s oration in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, 
he said that what matters is the “meaning conveyed” by the speech, not the literal 
content.  The forbidden counseling “may be accomplished as well by indirection as 
expressly, since words carry the meaning that they impart.”  Id. 
 62 See Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d. Cir. 1917). 
 63 See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment 
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 758–59 (1975). 
 64 See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA  
134–35 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). 
 65 For an argument that Hand’s Masses opinion might have influenced Holmes’s 
Abrams dissent in a variety of subtle ways, including regarding how much juries can be 
trusted in cases involving harsh criticism of government, see Thomas Healy, Anxiety and 
Influence: Learned Hand and the Making of a Free Speech Dissent, 50 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 803 
(2018).  
 66 See Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 3, 
1919, at 14 reprinted in 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 239 (1973)  
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including the question of whether Debs had had sufficient notice of what 
speech was punishable.  “To know what you may do and what you may 
not do, and how far you may go in criticism,” wrote Freund, “is the first 
condition of political liberty . . . .”67  Holmes read the article and was 
dismissive of the analysis.68  Nevertheless, Freund had a point, and it 
may well have registered with Holmes enough to have figured months 
later into his decision in Abrams to exclude consideration of remote 
harms.  
F.  Argument Six: Remote harms typically depend on so many 
different contingencies converging that speakers who initiate 
the causal sequence lack sufficient agency to be held 
responsible for the harms. 
A modern defender of the imminence requirement as a 
precondition for punishing speech could well think that this argument 
from attenuated agency has some purchase.  One could even cite Holmes 
in support of the proposition that contingency swallows up agency: 
“Man is like a strawberry plant, the shoots that he throws out take root 
and become independent centres.”69 But admitting that most speakers 
and writers have scant control over what audiences do with their ideas 
provides a reason to protect speech only if we assume that the 
regulation of speech, or at least criminal punishment for speech, has to 
track the agency of the speaker.  Holmes did not believe that. 
Regard for human agency did not play a large role in his legal or 
political philosophy.  About Kant’s postulate that human beings must be 
treated as ends and not means, Holmes said:   
I confess that I rebel at once.  If we want conscripts, we march 
them up to the front with bayonets in their rear to die for a 
cause in which perhaps they do not believe.  The enemy we 
treat not even as a means but as an obstacle to be abolished, if 
so it may be.  I feel no pangs of conscience over either step 
. . . .70 
Instead of the blameworthiness of the individual offender, Holmes 
believed that society’s desire for retribution, deterrence, and prevention 
 
 67 Id. at 240. 
 68 See Healy, supra note 65, at 818. 
 69 Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, supra note 54, at 23 (letter dated Sept. 6, 1920). 
 70 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1915).  See also 
HOWE, supra note 51, at 175–76; Gordon, supra note 50, at 724. (“Holmes also uses 
positivist method to refute Kant’s theory that possession should be legally protected 
because it is an extension of personality, an exercise of free will.”); David Luban, Justice 
Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L. J. 449, 470 (1994) (“Holmes 
was skeptical not only of Kant’s system of morality, but of morality as such.”). 
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via incapacitation is what justifies criminal punishment.71  He 
maintained, contrary to the view of almost all criminal law scholars both 
then and now, that what constitutes a criminal attempt is not conduct 
revealing sufficiently operationalized bad intentions but rather conduct 
creating an objective risk of impending harmful conduct.72 
One element of the danger test that Holmes put forth in the Abrams 
dissent might seem to cast doubt on this claim that he was unconcerned 
about speaker agency.  His careful formulation of the test reads as 
follows: “the United States constitutionally may punish speech that 
produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it 
will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United 
States may constitutionally seek to prevent.”73  In the following 
paragraph, he restates the test, again with speaker intent serving as an 
independent basis for regulation: “It is only the present danger of 
immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in 
setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not 
concerned.”74 
What does it say about Holmes’s understanding of his test that he 
thought either an actual danger of immediate harm or an intent on the 
part of the speaker to produce such a danger of immediate harm should 
be sufficient to justify government regulation?  Why should a speaker’s 
intention to create a present danger of immediate harm be considered a 
substitute for creating the danger?  Where is the speaker’s agency 
regarding harm when her advocacy produces no risk?  Holmes’s answer 
in Abrams to these questions was, “Publishing those opinions for the 
very purpose of obstructing [the war against Germany,] however, might 
indicate a greater danger and at any rate would have the quality of an 
attempt.”75  Recall that his idiosyncratic theory of criminal attempts 
rested on the objective dangers they create rather than the 
blameworthiness of the defendants.76  
In his dissent six years later in Gitlow v. New York,77 Holmes 
elaborated on how the concept of criminal attempt might bear on the 
freedom of speech: 
 
 71 See HOWE, supra note 51, at 160–83; see also H.L.A. Hart, Diamonds and String: 
Holmes on the Common Law, in ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 278–85 (1983). 
 72 See Francis A. Allen, Criminal Law, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 257–58 (1964); Edward 
J. Bloustein, Criminal Attempts and the Clear and Present Danger Theory of the First 
Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1118, 1120–25 (1989). 
 73 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (emphasis added). 
 74 Id. at 628 (emphasis added). 
 75 Id. 
 76 See authorities cited supra note 72.  
 77 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
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If the publication of this document had been laid as an attempt 
to induce an uprising against government at once and not at 
some indefinite time in the future it would have presented a 
different question.  The object would have been one with 
which the law might deal, subject to the doubt whether there 
was any danger that the publication could produce any result, 
or in other words, whether it was not futile and too remote 
from possible consequences.78  
This is a justification for taking into account the speaker’s purposes, but 
not to identify personal agency as a precondition for assigning legal 
responsibility, rather as a variable that bears on the likelihood that harm 
will occur forthwith.  As always, Holmes was thinking about collective 
consequences.79  
G.  Argument Seven: Permitting the government to regulate 
political advocacy as a means of preventing remote harms 
enables punishment for seditious libel.  
Two of the four counts on which the defendants were convicted of 
violating the Espionage Act of 1918 were for conspiring to publish 
“disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language about the form of 
Government of the United States” and conspiring to publish language 
“intended to bring the form of Government of the United States into 
contempt, scorn, contumely, and disrepute.”80  The majority in Abrams 
declined to rule on the constitutional validity of those counts because it 
found sufficient evidence in the record to support the convictions on the 
other two counts: encouraging resistance to the war effort and 
advocating curtailment of production of ordnance and ammunition.81  
But Holmes perceived in light of the severity of the sentences meted out 
to the defendants by the trial judge—twenty years imprisonment for 
three of the defendants, fifteen years for the fourth82—that concerns 
 
 78 Id. at 673. 
 79 The most illuminating, brief account of Holmes’s consequentialism can be found 
in Thomas C. Grey, Holmes on the Logic of the Law, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS 
INFLUENCE 136–38 (S. Burton ed. 2000) (“In political philosophy, Holmes was a 
preference utilitarian; he thought that people would naturally pursue their desires, and 
that the best system of government was one that gave them the most of what they 
wanted at the least cost. He was also a historicist, who believed that people were not 
solely driven by a universal desire for pleasure and aversion to pain, nor even by a small 
number of biologically given wants, but also by ideals and tastes that varied widely 
according to culture and history.”).  For a thoroughly researched and argued effort to 
paint Holmes as a utilitarian, see POHLMAN, supra note 50.  
 80 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617. 
 81 Id. at 624. 
 82 See RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND 
FREE SPEECH 145–46 (Cornell Univ. Press 1987). 
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about disloyalty and bringing the form of government into disrepute 
had infected consideration of all the counts in the indictment. 
Holmes’s suspicion that the prosecutions were about sedition as 
much as hampering recruitment and war production was possibly 
triggered by a surprising decision made by the Justice Department 
lawyers assigned to handle the appeal before the Supreme Court.  They 
chose to mount a full-throated defense of the view that Congress has 
authority under the First Amendment to punish speakers for seditious 
libel.  They maintained that the infamous Sedition Act of 1798 actually 
had been constitutional, notwithstanding the opinion to the contrary of 
James Madison, principal author of the First Amendment.83  The 
government lawyers’ daring attempt in Abrams to preserve seditious 
libel as a regulatory tool was ignored by the Court majority, but it 
certainly caught the attention of Holmes: 
I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that 
the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel 
in force.  History seems to me against the notion.  I had 
conceived that the United States through many years had 
shown its repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying 
fines that it imposed.84 
The constitutional status of seditious libel was a question that 
figured prominently in some of the arguments for free speech that were 
pressed upon Holmes in the months leading up to his Abrams dissent.  
In the Debs case itself, Gilbert Roe, a highly respected civil liberties 
lawyer, submitted an amicus brief contending that the Espionage Act of 
1917, the basis for Debs’ conviction, was a latter-day sedition act, clearly 
unconstitutional for the reasons advanced by Madison.85  Harvard law 
professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., wrote an article that Holmes read during 
the summer of 1919 before meeting the author at Harold Laski’s behest.  
In it Chafee proclaims, “The First Amendment was written by men . . . 
who intended to wipe out the common law of sedition, and make further 
prosecutions for criticism of government, without incitement to law-
breaking, forever impossible in the United States of America.”86  And 
 
 83 For an account of the government’s argument, see id. at 232–33.  Madison’s 
constitutional critique is reproduced in James Madison, Report on the Virginia 
Resolutions (1800), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 644–58 (J. N. Rakove ed., 1999). 
 84 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. 
 85 Brief of Gilbert E. Roe as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff in Error, Debs v. United 
States at 32–42, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (No. 714). 
 86 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in Wartime, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 947 
(1919).  For a detailed critique of this article and an account of how Chafee may have 
influenced Holmes, see David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment 
Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1283–1303, 1315–16 (1983); see also WHITE, supra  
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Learned Hand’s opinion in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, which Holmes 
read either in 1918 or early 1919,87 twice asserts that a publication 
cannot be denied access to the mails for creating a “seditious temper” or 
a “seditious disposition.”88 
All these arguments discrediting seditious libel might have given 
Holmes a straightforward reason to dissent in Abrams had the 
convictions been upheld by the majority on all four counts, including the 
two counts that sound in sedition.  But that was not the case.  Justice 
Clarke’s majority opinion studiously avoided relying on those two 
counts, and the counts that were held to warrant affirmance were about 
encouraging resistance and advocating curtailment of ammunition 
production, the latter of which at least has no whiff of sedition about it.   
What Holmes took from the severity of the sentences and the way 
the case had been argued, however, was that permitting a conviction for 
advocacy to be justified by a predicted impact in due course on the 
production of weaponry would allow seditious libel to enter through the 
back door.  In effect, it would result in war critics being punished, as 
Holmes put it, “for the creed they avow” rather than the harms they 
might cause.89  That dynamic, unmistakably operating in the case at 
hand, gave him a prophylactic rationale for restricting the kinds of harm 
that can justify punishment. 
H.  Argument Eight: Permitting remote harms to justify punishing 
expressions of opinion is inconsistent with highly valuing the 
freedom of thought.  
Holmes did not become a free speech legend for piercing the veil of 
a few de facto sedition prosecutions.  What has secured his place in First 
 
note 55, at 427–30.  For a fascinating narrative of how several progressives made efforts 
during the summer of 1919 to get Holmes to rethink his views about the freedom of 
speech, see THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT 1–5 (2013).  For a discerning brief account 
of these efforts see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Clear and Present Dangers of the Clear 
and Present Danger Test: Schenck and Abrams Revisited, 72 SMU L. REV. 415, 422–27 
(2019). 
 87 See Healy, supra note 65, at 806. 
 88 See Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (Hand, D.J.).  
Among judges, Hand was ahead of his time in considering seditious libel to be 
problematic.  The Second Circuit noted in reversing Hand’s ruling that one of the 
writings at issue is “not the voice of patriotism, and its language suggests disloyalty.”  
Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 37 (2d. Cir. 1917); see also James Weinstein, 
Learned Hand’s Masses Decision: Vindication and Influence, 50 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 927, 928 
(2018). 
 89 Even before Abrams, Holmes had indicated that prosecutions which are ostensibly 
about harm might violate the First Amendment if in reality they are targeted against 
“speech as such.”  See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919); see also Fox 
v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915).  
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Amendment history, prompting three different law reviews to publish 
symposia marking the Abrams centennial,90  has been the power of these 
words:   
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting 
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe 
the foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted 
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only 
ground upon which their wishes can be safely carried out.  
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.  It is an 
experiment, as all life is an experiment.91  
Much has been written in search of the meaning and implications 
of these immortal sentences.92  As always in matters Holmesian, Thomas 
Grey is the surest guide.  Assessing Holmes’s opinions in Abrams, Gitlow, 
and Schwimmer, he concludes, “It was skepticism, not belief in the power 
of free discussion to reach truth, or in the power of democratic 
deliberation to make sound policy, that lent such memorable eloquence 
and passion to these opinions.”93  As Grey well demonstrates, Holmes’s 
skepticism was not a form of indifference, denial, or withdrawal but 
rather engagement.94  How else to explain his voracious reading well 
into old age and the vigorous ongoing exchanges he had with numerous 
 
 90 In addition to this symposium, see Symposium: Contemporary Free Speech: The 
Marketplace of Ideas a Century Later, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1505, 1505–1774 (2019); 
Symposium, 72 SMU L. REV. 361, 361–545 (2019). 
 91 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 
 92 My own few drops in the ocean that is this literature include Vincent Blasi, Holmes 
and the Marketplace of Ideas, supra note 30; see also Vincent Blasi, Reading Holmes 
Through the Lens of Schauer: The Abrams Dissent, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343 (1997).  
 93 Thomas C. Grey, The Colin Raugh Thomas O’Fallon Memorial Lecture on Law and 
American Culture: Holmes, Pragmatism, and Democracy, 71 OR. L. REV. 521, 532 (1992); 
see also Grey, supra note 79, at 133–57; Thomas C. Grey, Plotting the Path of the Law, 63 
BROOK. L. REV. 19, 20 (1997); Grey, supra note 53, at 26–27; Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and 
Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 795, 804, 811–12 (1989).  I am not alone in 
judging Professor Grey to be the foremost authority on Holmes.  See Richard Posner, 
Foreword: Holmes, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 7, 9 (1997).   
 94 For a contrary view, see Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 
STAN. L. REV. 3 (1962); see also Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 
STAN. L. REV. 254 (1963).  For Grey’s response, see Grey, The Colin Raugh Thomas O’Fallon 
Memorial Lecture on Law and American Culture: Holmes, Pragmatism, and Democracy, 
supra note 93, at 524–25.  I explore Holmes’s skepticism in my Holmes and the 
Marketplace of Ideas, supra note 30, at 13–23. 
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regular correspondents young and old, liberal and conservative, even 
radical?95  How else to explain how hard he worked at his job?96  
The important point about Holmes’s engaged skepticism is that it 
led him to believe that the freedom of speech is much more than a luxury 
civil liberty97 to be extended in a charitable spirit when the cost is not 
too high.  Rather, as his Abrams dissent implies and his Schwimmer 
dissent makes explicit, “if there is any principle of the Constitution that 
more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle 
of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but 
freedom for the thought that we hate.”98   
Notice that here Holmes finds the value of speech to lie in the 
thought that it communicates.  In that regard, his Schwimmer opinion 
echoes his Abrams dissent, where he maintains that the defendants’ 
speech should be protected so as to be tested by “the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted” via “free trade in ideas.”99  Others might 
treat speaking and writing as uniquely privileged activities partly for 
reasons that have nothing to do with the ideas which are thereby 
 
 95 See, e.g., The Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, supra note 54; THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN 
LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND LEWIS EINSTEIN, 1903-1935 (J.B. 
Peabody ed., 1964); HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 20; HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra 
notes 20 and 23; Letters to Dr. Wu, in JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: HIS BOOK NOTICES 
AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS (H. Shriver ed., 1937).   
 96 See Charles E. Hughes, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 677, 678 (1931). 
 97 The term is Harry Kalven’s.  See KALVEN, supra note 64, at xxii.  We might think that 
Holmes treated the freedom of speech as a luxury civil liberty in that he sometimes 
characterized the speech he was protecting in denigrating terms.  He called the speech 
in Abrams “the surreptitious publishing of a silly pamphlet by an unknown man.”  
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919).  Gitlow’s manifesto he considered a 
“redundant discourse.”  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925).  Those 
descriptions might suggest that Holmes would not have protected the speakers had he 
thought their ideas might be consequential.   
We cannot know what he would have done if put to the test.  Certainly he went out of his 
way to say that even speech likely to cause real harm deserves protection when the harm 
is not imminent.  In Abrams, he posited a critic who during a war urges curtailment of 
airplane production in favor of other military procurement.  Such a critic must be free, 
Holmes maintained, to “advocate curtailment with success . . . even if it turned out that 
the curtailment hindered . . . the United States in the prosecution of the war.”  Abrams, 
250 U.S. at 627.  What is required to justify criminal punishment, he specified, is an 
“emergency” such that “an immediate check is required to save the country.”  Id. at 630.  
Of course, these professions are only dictum, but that is true also of Holmes’s 
disparaging assessments regarding the impotence of the defendants’ advocacy in 
Abrams and Gitlow.  In his contribution to this symposium, Professor Schauer surmises 
that Holmes had to have been aware that the speakers he wanted to protect in Abrams 
ran in circles where the use of violence as a political tactic was frequently discussed and 
sometimes practiced.  See Frederick Schauer, Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Abrams Case, 
and the Origins of the Harmless Speech Tradition, 51 SETON HALL L. REV. 205 (2020).  
 98 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929). 
 99 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (emphasis added). 
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generated.  Such additional reasons—mainly concerning the intrinsic 
satisfactions of autonomy, solidarity, and participation—played no part, 
however, in Holmes’s interpretation of the First Amendment.  His 
approach was entirely instrumental and focused on individual thought 
as it relates to collective understanding and will.100   
An idealist might prioritize the principle of free thought for its 
contribution to collective well-being via the harnessing of knowledge, 
affirmation of human dignity, or facilitation of governance based on 
popular sovereignty.  Holmes, the skeptic, prioritized free thought 
because he believed it helps people coexist amid intractable differences 
and adapt to inevitable changes in their environment.101   
It is noteworthy that in Abrams, he begins his riff about truth, 
competition, power, and acceptance by invoking what people “may 
come to believe” once they “realize[] that time has upset many fighting 
faiths.”102  And what he posits they will come to believe is that our 
knowledge is “imperfect,” that “all life is an experiment,” and that their 
understanding of those limits “is the only ground upon which their 
wishes safely can be carried out.”103  Holmes anticipated this line of 
argument the year before in his amazing five-page law review article 
Natural Law.  There he says that “while one’s experience . . . makes 
certain preferences dogmatic for oneself, recognition of how they came 
to be . . . leaves one able to see that others, poor souls, may be equally 
dogmatic about something else.  And this again means skepticism.”104  
Perhaps his most powerful and succinct articulation of the point is in his 
Lochner dissent, where he characterizes the Constitution as “made for 
people of fundamentally differing views.”105   
Holmes believed that by making salient and inescapable the 
existence of persistent differences of opinion and ineffectual current 
 
 100 See supra text accompanying note 79.   
 101 For an excellent detailed summary of Holmes’s reasons for according high value 
to the freedom of thought, see Steven J. Heyman, The Dark Side of the Force: The Legacy 
of Justice Holmes for First Amendment Jurisprudence, 19 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 661, 
685–95, 706–09 (2011).  Heyman faults Holmes for failing to be a liberal humanist.  That 
stern critique aside, Heyman’s descriptive account of Holmes’s thought is perceptive, 
faithful, and well-supported—a major contribution to the literature on Holmes.  In his 
recent article Holmes, Humility, and How Not to Kill Each Other, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1631 (2019), John Inazu develops the coexistence rationale as central to Holmes’s 
valuing of free speech.  See also Grey, supra note 53, at 33 (“Marked as he was by his war 
experience, Holmes was vividly aware of the community not as an organism but as a 
field of battle—’its’ different portions want different things’ as he said.”).  I emphasize 
the adaptation rationale in my Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, supra note 30.  
 102 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See Holmes, supra note 21, at 41. 
 105 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
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understandings, the freedom to express unpopular, even dangerous, 
opinions can serve as a force against certitude, rigidity, and stasis.  His 
bottom line was that we have no choice but to learn to live with those 
differences and with the chronic need to adjust or abandon some of our 
cherished beliefs in order to survive.  That his reasons for attaching 
supreme importance to free thought are not particularly uplifting does 
not undercut the claim that Holmes ascribed a great deal of positive 
value to it. 
The positive value that Holmes saw in the freedom to express one’s 
heretical and/or harmful thoughts bears on the question of whether the 
desire to prevent remote harms can serve as a justification for 
regulating expressions of opinion.  In the construction of First 
Amendment doctrine, concepts like “harm” and “evil” need not take 
their meaning exclusively from how the terms might be used in ordinary 
language or specialized endeavors other than constitutional 
interpretation.  The concept of harm should not be conceived of as a 
purely empirical phenomenon but rather as an element of the integrated 
system of concerns, objectives, commitments, and prescriptions 
embodied in the Constitution.  Thus, harm needs to be defined with 
reference to the values we ascribe to the activities subject to regulation 
in the name of harm, along with other considerations such as how some 
definitions of harm might facilitate abuse of the concept for unworthy 
ends.  Conceptions of harm that undermine the best reasons for having 
freedom of thought and freedom of speech are a misfit.106 
There is a word in Holmes’s precise formulation of his clear-and-
present-danger test in Abrams that deserves careful scrutiny.  He says 
that for expressions of opinion to be punishable, they must have the 
requisite close causal connection to “certain substantive evils that the 
United States constitutionally may seek to prevent.”107 Interestingly, 
Abrams was not the first case in which Holmes employed the adjective 
“substantive” to classify harms.  He did that in Schenck as well, where he 
said that expressions of opinion can be punished only when there is “a 
clear and present danger that they will bring about substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent.”108  What did he mean by “substantive”?  
What kind of evil would be non-substantive? 
 
 106 For an argument along these lines regarding what John Stuart Mill could and could 
not count as harm in On Liberty, see Jeremy Waldron, Mill and the Value of Moral Distress, 
35 POLITICAL STUDIES 410 (1987). 
 107 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (emphasis added).  For an informed view of what Holmes 
might have meant by “substantive” that differs from my understanding see Leslie 
Kendrick, On Clear and Present Danger, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.1653, 1664–66 (2019). 
 108 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (emphasis added). 
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“Substantive” could be taken to mean something like “significant in 
degree, duration, effect, or prominence.”  I submit, however, that by 
coupling his references to “substantive” on both occasions with 
references to what government has “a right to prevent,” Holmes was 
maintaining that certain consequences we might commonly call harms 
or evils are consequences that government has no authority to attempt 
to forestall.  Assuming that Holmes was thinking of the First Amendment 
as the source of such a limitation, the “harms” that Congress cannot 
consider to be harms in the constitutional sense most likely are such 
things as beliefs, attitudes, assumptions, objectives, and loyalties, all of 
which can be considered “non-substantive” in the sense that they are 
“non-material.” 
A non-substantive harm is not the same thing as a remote harm, 
even as the two categories overlap to a great degree.  In trying to 
understand Holmes’s thinking about remote harms, his explicit refusal 
to allow non-substantive harms to justify punishment for expressions of 
opinion is pertinent because it provides an example of his giving 
controlling significance to the positive value he ascribed to the freedom 
of thought.  Like remote harms, non-substantive harms are real.  People 
who experience those harms suffer.  A society that experiences those 
harms suffers.  Nevertheless, in the case of non-substantive harms, 
Holmes made the calculation that such suffering is insufficient to justify 
sacrificing the positive value of the freedom of thought.  So too, it seems, 
with the case of remote harms, including remote substantive harms. 
There is a striking asymmetry here to his balancing of societal harm 
and benefit.  Nothing could be more evident about Holmes’s 
understanding of the freedom of thought than that he perceived its 
benefits to be realized, for the most part, over time.  Like Milton before 
him,109 Holmes took the long view when it came to identifying the value 
of freedom of thought.  Coexistence and adaptation are not matters of 
immediate gratification.  Yet when it came to identifying the harms that 
can justify limiting the freedom to express opinions, he made imminence 
the key consideration, thereby ruling out long-term consequences.  That 
may be asymmetrical, but it is not necessarily illogical.  More 
importantly for Holmes, it is not necessarily indefensible as a matter of 
learning from experience.  The fact that the future is inscrutable and 
hostage to contingency may be more debilitating for predicting the 
harms from free thought than for predicting the benefits.  That was true 
for Holmes precisely because he perceived the transcendent benefit of 
 
 109 I document Milton’s prioritization of the claims of posterity in Vincent Blasi, A 
Reader’s Guide to Milton’s Areopagitica, The Foundational Essay of the First Amendment 
Tradition, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 308–12. 
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free thought to lie in its helping us learn to live with uncertainty and the 
absence of control. 
It is no accident that in Schwimmer, his valedictory statement about 
the First Amendment, what Holmes says the constitutional commitment 
protects at bottom is “the principle of free thought,”110 not the principle 
of freedom “for every possible use of language.”111  In On Liberty, John 
Stuart Mill made the same careful locution, reserving his strongest level 
of protection for the “Liberty of Thought and Discussion.”112  Holmes 
reread On Liberty in the spring of 1919.113  Years before, he had dined 
with Mill in London, then attended a lecture with him.114  The two were 
far from kindred spirits, however, because at the core of Mill’s 
philosophy was his fear of majorities,115 while Holmes considered 
majority understanding and will to be an important source of meaning, 
as well as basic to creating the ever-evolving, inevitably temporary 
order that enables individual survival and engagement.116  
What Holmes and Mill had in common, despite their profound 
differences,117 was the belief that for the freedom of thought to operate 
as a force against stasis it needs to be accorded “absolute” (Mill’s 
term)118 protection.  To rule in particular cases that the benefits of free 
thought are outweighed by the need to prevent remote harms would be 
to compromise the elemental, society-defining role that the principle of 
free thought played for Mill and Holmes.  Each considered public 
opinion to be important and all-too-often dominated by inertia, denial, 
and resistance to change.  A freedom to think that can be overridden by 
inevitably subjective predictions of remote harm might advance 
knowledge or adaptation in some ways under certain conditions, but the 
 
 110 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929). 
 111 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919). 
 112 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 86 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale 
Univ. Press 2003) (1859). 
 113 See HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 20, at 187 (letter of Feb. 28, 1919). 
 114 See STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: A LIFE IN WAR, LAW, AND IDEAS 140 
(W. W. Norton & Co. 2019). 
 115 See MILL, supra note 112, at 78–80. 
 116 See supra text accompanying notes 31–34.  See also Holmes, supra note 21, at 40.  
On Holmes’s understanding of majoritarianism as a source of order see CATHARINE PIERCE 
WELLS, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: A WILLING SERVANT TO AN UNKNOWN GOD 166–73, 196–200 
(2020). 
 117 For a comprehensive and probing comparison of the free speech arguments of 
Mill and Holmes, see Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of 
John Stuart Mill’s and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 35 (2010).  
 118 MILL, supra note 112, at 82.  I explain how this absolutism is consistent with Mill’s 
professed utilitarianism in Shouting “Fire!” in a Theater and Vilifying Corn Dealers, 39 
CAP. U. L. REV. 535, 546–48 (2011). 
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fragile quality of such a contingent mental freedom would be enervating, 
making it no match for the forces of stasis.  The freedom of thought 
exists to engender, Mill and Holmes agreed, not just discrete discoveries 
within predetermined bounds but a shared disposition in the populace 
to hold all conventional understandings to account in the light of time 
and experience.  That Mill believed a sufficiently corrigible public 
opinion can lead to progress while Holmes’s sights were less elevated 
does not break their bond on this point.   
It is noteworthy that throughout his lengthy chapter on the liberty 
of thought and discussion, Mill never once discusses the harms that free 
thought might engender, even as in subsequent chapters of On Liberty 
he specifies how harm, carefully defined, can limit other liberties.119  In 
Abrams, Holmes does not employ the term “absolute,” but the logic of 
the imminence requirement, as he presents it, categorically rejects the 
relevance of all remote harms.  Moreover, he does say that whatever else 
about the defendants’ speech and conduct might arguably be a basis for 
regulation, “the creed they avow” is something “no one has a right even 
to consider.”120  On the facts of the Schwimmer case, Holmes could have 
laid waste to the majority’s empirical claim that remote harm to future 
conscription might follow from allowing a fifty-one-year-old pacifist to 
become a naturalized citizen.  Instead, he rested his dissent on the 
fundamentality of freedom of thought.  
Holmes possibly was influenced in this respect by the example of 
Learned Hand’s judgment in the Masses case that speech that is of 
fundamental importance to the democratic process cannot be 
prohibited even though it is likely to cause considerable harm.121  
Holmes had no use for Hand’s theory that permitting “hostile criticism” 
is essential to legitimating government authority122—Holmes did not 
think in such terms—but he had other reasons sounding in coexistence 
and adaptation to consider free thought to be fundamental.  His opinion 
in Abrams embraces that assumption by positing instances of speech 
which simply cannot be made illegal, such as that of a patriot 
questioning war production priorities or a visionary attempting to 
“change the mind of the country.”123 
 
 119 See MILL, supra note 112, at 139, 142–43, 156, 160. 
 120 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629–30 (1919). 
 121 See Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).  Holmes had 
read Hand’s Masses opinion by the time he wrote his Abrams dissent, though exactly 
when is not established.  See Healy, supra note 65, at 806. 
 122 See Masses Publ’g Co., 244 F. at 540. 
 123 See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627–28. 
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In addition to emphasizing the fundamentality of free thought, 
Holmes and Mill had in common the belief that speech which causes 
harm immediately has little to do with freedom of thought.  In fact, their 
shared refusal to conflate the freedom of thought with the freedom of 
speaking is what made their absolutism regarding free thought tenable.  
In On Liberty, Mill says that telling an audience that corn dealers are 
starvers of the poor should be protected when the message is conveyed 
in the press but not when it is “delivered orally to an excited mob 
assembled before the house of a corn-dealer.”124  Conceivably, he treated 
the two cases differently on the ground that the harm potential is 
greater in the mob situation.  But is it really, given the exponentially 
greater number of persons who receive the message when it is 
disseminated via the press?  More likely, Mill considered the two 
situations distinguishable on the ground that in the excited mob 
example neither the speaker nor the listeners are exercising their 
“liberty of thought,” even as they might be exercising other 
communicative or expressive liberties which in the scheme developed 
in On Liberty deserve only qualified immunity from regulation.  This is 
how the preeminent Mill scholar John Skorupski understands the twin 
corn dealer examples.  He interprets Mill’s “liberty of thought and 
discussion” to be based wholly on the value of “dialogue effects,” defined 
as “those which occur through the autonomous response of a recipient 
who engages with the expression critically, as an act of dialogue.”125  
That is not what is happening in the excited mob example. 
Mill judged liberty of thought to be a special freedom, which 
generates unique, enduring, and radiating societal benefits—benefits he 
had memorably cataloged in Chapter Two of On Liberty.126  He took the 
unique benefits of the freedom of thought to be so fundamental as to 
require “absolute” protection for the type of communication that 
generates them, as he explained in Chapter One of On Liberty.127  In that 
regard, he treated communication that embodies or facilitates the 
liberty of thought differently from other types of communication. 
Had Holmes addressed the two corn dealer examples, I believe he 
would have come down just as Mill did, and with the same emphasis on 
the presence or absence of free thought rather than the lower or higher 
probability of harm.  When Holmes said that “every idea is an 
 
 124 MILL, supra note 112, at 121. 
 125 See JOHN SKORUPSKI, JOHN STUART MILL 371, 374 (1989). 
 126 See MILL, supra note 112, at 118–20. 
 127 Id. at 82–83.   
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incitement,”128 he did not imply that every incitement is an idea.129  
Many incitements have nothing to do with thought or discussion.  Mill 
and Holmes had very different notions about why free thought is 
valuable,130 but they were on the same page regarding what activities 
are encompassed by the concept.  It would never have occurred to Mill, 
for example, to include falsely—or even truthfully—shouting “Fire!” in 
a theater in his chapter on the liberty of thought and discussion.  Like 
Holmes, Mill would have considered such a warning to be an entirely 
different kind of activity.131 
Holmes also shared with Mill the view that certain conceptions of 
harm cannot be employed because to do so would be inconsistent with 
prioritizing the freedom of thought.132  Just as Mill could not count as 
harm the genuine feelings of moral distress that observers can 
experience when confronted with ideas they find abhorrent,133 Holmes 
could not count remote harm as a reason to regulate the freedom of 
thought despite the undeniable fact that immoral, unwise, and ill-
motivated ideas certainly can cause significant delayed or cumulative 
harm.  To allow remote harms to justify punishment for the public 
expression of ideas, he concluded, would strip free thought of its 
necessary vitality, something he considered more basic to human 
survival and coexistence than whatever public safety gains might be 
achieved by authorizing such punishment.  
In his article Privilege, Malice, and Intent, published in the Harvard 
Law Review in 1894, Holmes explained how under the common law, a 
 
 128 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925). 
 129 The majority opinion in Gitlow labeled the defendant’s verbose, formulaic call for 
future revolutionary action a “direct incitement,” prompting Holmes to cry foul.  Id.  
at 665.  Professor Chafee had the last word on whether Gitlow’s pamphlet had the 
capacity to incite: “Any agitator who read these thirty-four pages to a mob would not 
stir them to violence, except possibly against himself.  This Manifesto would disperse 
them faster than the Riot Act.”  ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 319 
(1941). 
 130 See Ten Cate, supra note 117. 
 131 See Richard Vernon, John Stuart Mill and Pornography: Beyond the Harm Principle, 
106 ETHICS 621, 623 (1996) (Mill’s liberty of thought and discussion encompasses only 
“propositions about actual or desirable states of affairs in the world, propositions 
capable of being accumulated into larger bodies of knowledge.”). 
 132 For general discussions of Mill’s conception of harm in On Liberty, see David O. 
Brink, Mill’s Liberal Principles and Freedom of Expression, in MILL’S ON LIBERTY: A CRITICAL 
GUIDE 42 (C.L. Ten ed., 2008); D.G. Brown, Mill on Harm to Others’ Interests, 26 POL. STUD. 
395, 396–97 (1978); JOHN GRAY, MILL ON LIBERTY: A DEFENSE 57 (2d ed. 1996).  For an 
argument that Mill counts as harm only “perceptible damage,” perhaps the closest 
equivalent to what Holmes called “substantive evil,” see JONATHAN RILEY, MILL ON LIBERTY 
99 (1998). 
 133 See Waldron, supra note 106, at 413. 
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privilege entitles an actor to cause harm with legal impunity even when 
the harm is considerable.  He maintained that such privileges inevitably 
are grounded in the policy judgment that the benefit to society of 
recognizing the privilege outweighs the conceded harm.134  Three years 
later, in his famous article The Path of the Law, Holmes returned to the 
subject of legal privilege to harm: 
Why is a false and injurious statement privileged, if it is made 
honestly in giving information about a servant?  It is because 
it has been thought more important that information should 
be given freely, than that a man should be protected from what 
under other circumstances would be an actionable wrong.  
Why is a man at liberty to set up a business which he knows 
will ruin his neighbor?  It is because the public good is 
supposed to be subserved by free competition.135 
Holmes conceived of the freedom of thought as a constitutional privilege 
also deriving from a consequentialist calculation regarding the public 
good.136 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Holmes simply did not believe that the benefits to audiences, 
present and future, that flow from the freedom of thought are 
threatened by recognizing a power in government to punish advocacy 
that “produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger 
that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils.”137  
Criminalizing expressions of opinion to prevent predicted remote harms 
was for him a different matter altogether in terms of the potential 
deleterious impact on the freedom of thought going forward.  During the 
course of the tumultuous year 1919, he came to believe that the only 
safe way to prevent dissenters from being prosecuted “for the creed 
they avow” is to disallow the consideration of remote harms.  Ultimately, 
the high instrumental value of freedom of thought, rather than the 
unlikelihood, unimportance, or unprovability of remote harms, is what 
determined the issue for him. 
 
 
 134 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3–4 
(1894).   
 135 Holmes, supra note 52, at 466. 
 136 On Holmes’s consequentialism, see Grey, supra note 79. 
 137 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919). 
